GENDER AND COLONIALISM:
WOMEN’S ORGANISATION UNDER THE RAJ

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Synopsis—The popular media have recently borne witness to a renewed interest in India under British rule. This article examines the portrayal of Indian liberation struggles in two of the more serious expositions, The Jewel in the Crown and Gandhi, questioning the political implications of this portrayal. It shows that they both neglect the crucial role played by women in the maintainance and demise of the Raj. We argue that women’s contribution was so significant that its omission constitutes a misrepresentation of history that can fairly be termed revisionist. We suggest that the reason for this process of mystification lies in the relevance of India’s fight for national liberation and sexual equality in the early twentieth century, to present day struggles against imperialism and male domination, which are two of the most explosive issues affecting the modern Western world.

We have recently seen in the popular British media a re-kindled interest in India under British rule, which Salman Rushdie has termed the Raj Revival (Rushdie, 1984). It includes the films Gandhi and Octopussy, the television showings of two novels, The Jewel in the Crown and The Far Pavilions, and the documentaries Clive of India, and War of the Springing Tiger on Subhas Chandra Bose. The film of A Passage to India was released recently. The debate over the meaning of the Revival is unresolved. It has been described in the Financial Times as an ‘extraordinary process of re-education on the British Empire’ (Dunkley, 1984). The dispute centres on whether the re-education is revisionist or progressive. We intend to examine this question in relation to the portrayal of women, by focussing on Gandhi and Jewel in the Crown as the most popular of the more serious projects.

Salman Rushdie’s critique of Jewel in the Crown attacks the Revival as a ‘revisionist enterprise’, rewriting the history of India’s freedom struggle as the activities of the ‘officer class and its wife’ and justifying contemporary conservative ideologies of white racial superiority (Rushdie, 1984: 19). Mihir Bose, who defends Subhas Chandra Bose from his portrayal in War of the Springing Tiger agrees with Rushdie’s analysis (Bose, 1984). Julian Barnes denies these charges and argues that the Revival is progressive on the grounds that some of the projects focussed on British withdrawal rather than the establishment of the Raj, that Clive of India presented an unambiguously anti-imperialist stance, and that Jewel in the Crown attributed the ‘damn bloody senseless mess’ to the British (Barnes, 1984: 21). Ken Taylor, who adapted Jewel in the Crown for television, doesn’t seem to know what he, or Paul Scott the author, intended, for he writes, ‘I am sure that Paul Scott never intended anything so crude as a simple condemnation of the Raj, or of the Labour Government which brought it to an end. There is so much more to it than that’ (Taylor, 1984: 10). But he gives no hint of what that might be.

Of course, the projects do not all contrive to present the same picture, nor do the authors collude

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Recently they have completed a joint study of Professional Women in India in which they address issues of gender, caste and class. It will be published shortly by Zed Books.
to produce one message. With the possible exception of *Clive of India*, however, what they have in common is the mystification of some crucial aspect of history which thereby obscures our understanding of events. The subtext of the more serious programmes lies precisely in the fact that they do not convey an entirely Western ethnocentric view, but contain a limited critique of the British occupation and plundering of the colonies. To this extent the Revival is progressive. But next to the critique is posed an insidious legitimisation of the Western presence, quite apart from historical errors and omissions. Salman Rushdie shows how *Jewel in the Crown* overstressed the importance of British actions and underplayed the significance of Indian resistance (Rushdie, 1984). Madhu Kishwar demonstrates the same effect in *Gandhi*, where the Mahatma was consistently portrayed in relation to Western political leaders and sycophantic hangers-on, in what she terms the Mountbatten view of history, rather than in relation to the people of India, thus obscuring the Indian perspective and mystifying India’s history (Kishwar, 1983). It is this mediation of imperialism through Western perspectives of justification which is revisionist and which appeals to British audiences, for it legitimates even in its criticism.

One of the major ways in which the Raj Revival mystifies Indian history is in its treatment of women. *The Jewel in the Crown* was billed as ‘the story of a rape’ (see for example the advertisement in the *New Statesman*, 6.1.1984 p.13). One might be forgiven for thinking that the main character would be female, but the picture under these words advertising the programme reveals two men confronting each other—one English, one Indian. Perhaps then the rape is a metaphor for Britain’s violation of Indian territory and property? But if so, one can only ask along with Salman Rushdie, why the rape was not of an Indian woman by and Englishman. In fact, in contrast to the plethora of Englishwomen there is hardly an Indian woman to be seen in the entire twelve week series apart from little Edward’s ayah.

If *Jewel in the Crown* defines the Freedom Movement as the activities of the officer class and its wife, Attenborough’s *Gandhi* projects it as the activities of Indian men. The few women who feature in the film play largely passive and stereotyped roles. As Madhu Kishwar points out, most of the women are presented as Gandhi’s personal servants, his wife Kasturba is positively slavish, and Sarojini Naidu is given one minute in a three hour film in which to represent female participation in the struggle (Kishwar, 1983). These criticisms do not constitute another plea to rediscover women’s history. The charge they make is that women’s role was so crucial in the Raj that its neglect constitutes a misrepresentation of history.

As we will show, women held a special significance for the British Raj and, perhaps as a result, they also played a vital part in its downfall. To examine this question we will look at two features: the significance of women to the British rulers, and the part women played in the Freedom Movement.

**WOMEN AND THE RAJ**

The British in India saw themselves as a force for enlightenment, especially for women. To support their claim, they pointed to the laws liberalising women’s legal position. Between 1772 and 1947 they introduced nine major reforms, including the laws forbidding female infanticide, sati and child marriage, and those raising the age of consent, allowing widow remarriage, and improving women’s inheritance rights (Everett, 1981: 144–145; Thapar, 1963: 482, 487; Mirchandani, 1970: 253). They were supported in all these cases by Indian reformers. But British support for the issues was often ambiguous, and their actions on other issues contradicted their claim to be a progressive influence.

Official British policy was one of non-interference in personal and religious matters, which inhibited the evolution of social change in written law. But as Jana Matson Everest shows (1981: 141–144), this would not have mattered had not Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, interfered with the Hindu concept of law in 1772. Hindu law was based on custom, flexibly interpreted in line with prevailing opinion, and embodying a vast diversity of approaches according to cultural, regional and caste differences. Most law was unwritten, except that of personal and religious matters, which inhibited the evolution of social change in written law. But as Jana Matson Everest shows (1981: 141–144), this would not have mattered had not Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, interfered with the Hindu concept of law in 1772. Hindu law was based on custom, flexibly interpreted in line with prevailing opinion, and embodying a vast diversity of approaches according to cultural, regional and caste differences. Most law was unwritten, except that of the brahmins (the highest caste). But Hastings imposed the brahmins’ religious texts upon all Hindus as the sole legal authority, in an attempt to make Hindu custom fit in with British law, applying uniformly to everyone and based on the binding force of Parliamentary Acts interpreted according to precedent.

The effect of this was to impose the constraints which previously applied only to high caste women onto all Hindu women. High caste women were subject to the strictest legal constraints on their activities in order to preserve the purity of caste. For instance, most high caste women could not own immovable family property, could marry only once even if widowed in infancy, and were not allowed divorce. Lower caste women had no customary prohibition on divorce or remarriage, and no formal prohibition on the ownership of property.

Britain further rigidified Indian law shortly after the British Crown took over the Government of India from the East India Company. In 1858 Victoria’s Proclamation as the first Empress of India confirmed the policy of non-interference (Wolpert, 1977: 240–241), but after 1864 the legal interpretation of religious texts by Hindu pundits was replaced...
by the decisions of Western educated Indian judges interpreting the texts according to developing precedent. The effect was to tie Indian law even more firmly to the past, inhibiting its evolution in accordance with changing custom (Everett, 1981: 144).

Two examples illustrate the contradictory approach of the British to women's legal position in India. Sati (widow burning) was probably the cause for which they claimed most credit. By contrast, the destruction of the matrilineal family through the imposition of economic and legal measures, is discreetly forgotten.

Sati

The British took a lot of credit for suppressing sati. The rite was widely practised by some of the upper castes, especially kshatriyas (the second highest caste) in the eighteenth century. In some states, one of the measures of a prince's achievements was the number of women he took to the funeral pyre with him. Twenty was considered 'normal' but cases were recorded of as many as 84 (Thompson, quoted in Baig, 1976: 20). The matter was first raised in the British parliament at the turn of the nineteenth century by Wellesley, Governor-General of India, but his plea to abolish sati was consistently rejected (Spear, 1970: 123). In 1812, 1815 and 1817 the British Government passed laws prohibiting the use of force or intoxication to induce a woman to the pyre, but they still refused to outlaw sati itself. Not until 1829, thanks to the liberal Governor-General Bentinck, was sati finally prohibited in British India (Mirchandani, 1970: 235).

More than 20 years of inaction went by before this was done, despite the campaigns of Indian and British reformers. Even amongst the liberals like Bentinck, British motives were by no means unambiguous. The liberal coalition challenging Tory ideas in England at that time consisted of the Radicals and the Evangelicals. The former saw India as backward and irrational, the latter saw her as heathens awaiting salvation from superstitions like sati through the enlightenment of Christianity (Spear, 1970: 121-122). Their purpose was not to liberate women but to introduce their own concept of reason and their own religion respectively.

The suppression of sati marked the first Government intervention in the Hindu religion, and was claimed by the British as their first initiative towards the liberation of Indian women. But the ambiguities behind the move could clearly be seen in the ulterior motives behind the intervention and in the reluctance to interven over two decades. In contrast, however, the laws imposed on the matrilineal family explicitly and deliberately removed women's former freedoms and imposed on them new constraints.

Family organisation

The Nayars of Malabar in the state of Kerala maintained a matrilineal form of family until the British removed the women's marriage and inheritance rights in the nineteenth century, as shown by Maria Mies (1980: 84-90). The Nayar family or 'taravad' consisted of a woman, her brothers and sisters, and successive generations of the women's children (Mencher, 1965: 298). Women received the right to sexual activity at puberty, after a marriage ceremony in which neither partner received any rights or duties towards the other. The woman could then have 'sambandhan' relationships with visiting husbands, which could be begun and ended without formality. The husbands lived in their mother's house and could only visit their wives in the evening. Family property was held in common by all members of the taravad, and could not be divided unless everyone agreed that the taravad had grown too large. The eldest brother (the 'karanavan') held authority and administered the property, but could not dispose of it, and the taravad could remove him if they considered him incompetent (Mies, 1980: 84-85). The taravad contained no in-laws, no husbands and no fathers. Subsistence for all members was provided in the natal family, and there was no father–child relationship, and no concept of a marital family, since sambandhan relationships had no necessary permanence.

In the nineteenth century the British enacted a series of laws which radically altered the organisation of sexuality and inheritance in the Nayar family. In 1868 a law was passed that a man had to provide for his wife and children, a concept that was meaningless within the organisation of the taravad (Rao, 1957: 133). Karanavans then began giving taravad property to their own children, and 4365 cases were brought against them in the Travancore courts between 1887 and 1906 (Kapadia, 1968: 344).

In 1896 the Madras Marriage Act designated the sambandhan relationship a monogamous marriage, dissolvable only through legal process, and giving the wife and children the right to maintenance by the husband. Fortunately this law had little effect since sambandhan relationships were not registered (Mies, 1980: 87).

Subsequently a number of Nayar Regulation Laws declared the giving of a gift to the woman (as was expected at the start of a relationship) a legal act of marriage; polygamy was prohibited; marriage could be dissolved only through a legal divorce; and the non-Nayar father was given the right to inherit the property of his wife's family. This resulted in the death of the symbolic marriage ceremony at puberty (Rao, 1957: 98-100). The Malabar Wills Act of 1898 gave the man the right to dispose of his private property to his children, which was impossible in the taravad because all property was owned in common.
The 1912 Travancore Nayar Regulations permitted the division of taravad land, and the 1933 Madras Marriage Act designated the wife's children rather than the sister's children, that is the taravad, as a man's heirs (Rao, 1957: 139–144).

The British saw the sexual freedom of the women as promiscuity rather than simply a different form of family organisation, and viewed the collective ownership of property through the female line as the dispossession of the males. Their onslaught against Nayar organisation of sexuality and inheritance destroyed the structure of the matrilineal family, removed the women's sexual rights, abolished collective ownership of property and dispossessed the women from their inheritance. As Maria Mies demonstrates, the change was not the inevitable result of urbanisation and industrialisation, but the outcome of concerted legal and economic actions initiated by the British to eliminate a form of social organisation to which they were deeply hostile.

(Mies, 1980: 89).

The importance of women's subordination to the Raj

The attack on the Hindu concept of law, and the actions over sati and the matrilineal family, show that the British approach to the position of women was contradictory. They liberalised the law for some groups of women, but imposed constraints on others. They claimed both to be a liberalising influence and that their policy was of non-interference. The fact is that they were highly selective both in their non-interference and in their liberalising.

The reason for this was that the subordination of women by Indian men provided the British with one of their favourite justifications for foreign rule. They had an interest both in maintaining women's subordinate position and in liberalising it. The former was to show that India was not yet fit for Self Rule, the latter to demonstrate Britain's superiority in relations between the sexes. This is well illustrated by the controversy created by a book written in 1927 by Katherine Mayo called Mother India. The book described the effects of patriarchal abuses on women, and concluded that it was male dominance, not British colonialism, which was responsible for India's 'poverty, sickness, ignorance ... melancholy, ineffectiveness ... inferiority' (Mayo, 1927: 22). In conflating the two issues of imperialism and patriarchy, the book provided the perfect legitimisation for rejecting India's demands for Self Rule. The New Statesman wrote in 1927 that the book revealed:

'the filthy habits of even the most highly educated classes in India—which, like the degradation of Hindu women, are unequalled even amongst the most primitive African or Australian savages' (quoted in Andrews, 1967: 114).

And it ended:

'Katherine Mayo makes the claims for Swaraj (Self Rule) seem nonsense and the will to grant it almost a crime.' (Quoted in Andrews, 1967: 110–111).

Had the book not been written in the context of foreign rule, or had it acknowledged the contribution of colonialism to the maintenance of patriarchal abuses, the defensive reactions it provoked amongst Indians could have been categorised as apologies for patriarchy, but the colonial context confounded such an interpretation. For Mayo's book was used by the equally patriarchal British, not to argue for the abolition of male dominance, but to perpetuate the oppression of imperialism. Indian patriarchy formed one of the pillars upon which the British colonists built their rule over the country.

WOMEN AND SWARAJ

In view of the way patriarchy was used by the colonists it is not surprising that when women began to organise against male domination during the last fifty years of the Raj, they focussed on imperialism as one of the major causes of their oppression. As Geraldine Forbes notes (1982: 529) the women blamed their subordination not on men, but on custom, arising out of India's history of wars, invasions and imperialism, and argued that women's issues could not be separated from the question of foreign domination. They defused male opposition and won support for their cause by linking freedom for women with freedom for India, forming an alliance with the national movement in the struggle for Swaraj.

The benefits of this alliance did not accrue only to the women, for the freedom movement gained too. Gandhi recognised the importance of drawing women into the Swaraj campaigns in order to create a mass movement, and in doing so he too linked national liberation to women's liberation. 'Many of our movements', he said 'stop halfway because of the condition of our women. Much of our work does not yield appropriate results' (Gandhi quoted in Kishwar, 1983: 46). Gail Omvedt shows that one of his skills as leader of the Indian National Congress was to mediate the discontent of the mass of women so that they remained targeted at foreign rule, uniting both sexes behind the cause of Independence (Omvedt, 1975: 47). But besides the numerical success of the movement, there was a deeper reason why Gandhi valued women's presence. He believed that women's qualities made them perfectly suited to his philosophy and practice of non-violent resistance, and indeed suggested that
he had learnt this approach from his wife's implacable but silent resistance to his own demands on her (Kishwar, 1983: 46). He believed that women would become the leaders in 'satyagraha' (non-violent resistance), which is based on self sacrifice:

'I do believe that it is woman's mission to exhibit ahimsa (non-violence) at its highest and best. . . . For woman is more fitted than man to make ahimsa. For the courage of self-sacrifice woman is any way superior to man, as I believe, man is to woman for the courage of the brute' (Gandhi, 1938: 21, quoted in Kishwar, 1983: 46).

And he had no doubt about who had the most to contribute to the struggle, and which sex he would prefer to have as his campaigners:

'I would love to find that my future army contained a vast preponderance of women over men. If the fight came, I should then face it with a greater confidence than if men predominated. I would dread the latter's violence. Women would be my guarantee against such an outbreak' (Gandhi, 1939, quoted in Kishwar, 1983: 46).

Admiration:

No commentator could ignore the success of the Freedom Movement in bringing women out of their seclusion. The British historian Percival Spear commented:

'As the day wore on, even in the European streets I noticed that in ones and twos Indian women were seating themselves on chairs at the doors of certain shops . . . . But if anyone attempted to enter, the lady joined her hands in supplication: she pleaded, she reasoned, and if all else failed, she would throw herself across the threshold and dare him to walk over her body. These women have been known to fling themselves in front of a car, and lie upon the ground before its wheels, until its owner yielded and took back into the shop the forbidden goods he had bought . . . . The picketers went in their hundreds to prison, but always there were more to take their place . . . . If they have not yet won Swaraj for India, they have completed the emancipation of their own sex. Even in the Conservative North, I heard the ripping of curtains and veils.' (Brailsford, 1943: 178-179).

The British response to the civil disobedience campaign was to declare the National Congress an illegal organisation and to arrest most of the leaders. It was at this point that the women on their own initiative took over the direction and organisation of the campaign, to the surprise even of Nehru:

'Most of us menfolk were in prison. And then a remarkable thing happened. Our women came to the front and took charge of the struggle. Women had always been there of course but now there was an avalanche of them, which took not only the British government but their own menfolk by surprise . . . . Here were these women, women of the upper or middle classes, leading sheltered lives in their homes, peasant women, working class women, rich women, poor women, pouring out in their tens of thousands in defiance of government order and police lathi (baton).' (Nehru, 1946: 29-30).

Some of the women leaders are now famous names in Indian history. Sarojini Naidu directed the salt protest after Gandhi's arrest until she herself was arrested (Everett, 1981: 114). Her biographer wrote that she was named the Indian 'Judith', and was heard telling the police, 'We ask no quarter and we shall give none, and I will cut the barbed wire with pliers, and seize the salt with my own hands' (Sengupta, 1966: 234). Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay was equally bold, as the biographer of Nehru's sister commented:

'Processions only of women marched in cities, towns and back country roads. Leaving their homes in thousands, they put themselves in the forefront where police and soldiers blocked the line of the march. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay . . . . is said to have rallied women to join her, interposing between men surrounding Gandhi, and the British cavalry about to ride them down,

Freedom for India

Women in fact took part in the Swaraj campaigns of all kinds, peaceful and militant, legal and illegal. Aparna Basu writes:

'Women organised themselves into groups and were willing to join processions, face police firing and go to prison. They broke the salt law, picketed shops selling liquor and foreign manufactured cloth. There were women who joined terrorist groups and helped in editing and distributing banned newspapers and manufacturing bombs.' (Basu, 1976: 39).

No commentator could ignore the success of the Freedom Movement in bringing women out of their seclusion. The British historian Percival Spear notes:

'The event which did more than any other single factor to speed the process of women's rights was the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-31. Feeling was then so strong that those women already in public life joined Congress Committees and took to organising pickets for liquor and cloth shops, processions and demonstrations . . . . while many thousands came out of conditions of privacy and semi-seclusion to support the cause. Some of these were so ardent that at times, as in Delhi, they directed the whole Congress movement in an area until arrested.' (Spear, 1970: 213-214).

An English eye witness at the time of the campaigns reported the following scene with some wonder and admiration:
with the remark: “It is much harder to murder women than men.” Ordered to charge, British troops refused to obey; and Kamaladevi was, and is, a national heroine. ’ (Andrews, 1967: 130–131).

But army disobedience in the face of women engaged in civil disobedience was the exception. British army and police officers and government officials had no compunction about ordering women to be treated to the same brutality as the men, whether it was a peaceful demonstration or a display of passive resistance. On 21 January 1931 Ganga-behn Vaidya ‘led a procession of 1200 women in Borsad. The procession was lathi-charged, Ganga-behn was severely beaten up and bled profusely, but she did not give up the tricolour she was carrying. She was in and out of jail till 1934’ (Basu, 1976: 27). Nor was it only the women leaders who were mistreated. More than 80,000 people were arrested during the salt campaign, and of these over 17,000 were women (Basu, 1976: 29). The British often sentenced teenage girls to two years rigorous imprisonment ‘for merely shouting slogans or gathering in assembly’ (Andrews, 1967: 132–133).

When the police could no longer arrest because the jails were full, they tried other ways of intimidating the women:

‘The then Government of India, which considered itself the custodian of Lancashire and Manchester interests, was certainly not going to look on complacently at these feminine antics. Picketing was declared illegal and picketers began to be arrested, but the more the arrests the larger became the number of picketers. In fact the ban only added fire to the campaign . . . the prisoners began to be let off without convictions because the problem of housing them became an impossible one.

The police hit on various devices to terrorize women. In some places, particularly the larger cities, they bundled them into police vans and drove them out into jungles and released them when the night came on, hoping that they would be too frightened to drift back into the campaign again. But it did not work.

In other places the police turned water hoses on the women, hoping to cause discomfiture and embarrassment. They also tried throwing mustard and pepper powder at them and even beating them.’ (Chattopadhyay, 1958: 25).

As Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay observed, the British disliked the presence of large numbers of women in the movement because it exposed police brutality and added a moral dimension to the struggle:

‘The authorities from the very first regarded women as intruders and resented their presence in the movement. Women undoubtedly added moral weight to the cause and at the same time threw into greater relief police atrocities. At first there were only rumblings and cursings below the breath on the part of the authorities, but later they became more vociferous.’ (Chattopadhyay, 1958: 26).

The presence of women taking an active part in the campaign of deliberate law-breaking was the most remarkable feature of the Freedom Movement, noted by observers everywhere. The movement itself and commentators both contemporary and historical (see for example Nehru, 1946; Braistord, 1943; Spear, 1970) concurred with Kamaladevi’s assessment that ‘with the very first phase of the political movement, a new chapter had opened in the history of Indian women. There is no doubt that theirs was a key role. It can be confidently said that without their help the movement could never have been a success’ (Chattopadhyay, 1958: 29).

Women’s liberation

The women did not only fight for the freedom of India. They also worked for their own liberation. The Women’s Movement had strong links with the Freedom Movement since its inception, but the radicalising influence of participation in the struggle for Swaraj made the Women’s Movement more explicitly political. They set up autonomous women’s organisations, in which they developed an analysis of women’s oppression and a programme of action (Forbes, 1982). They saw their oppression as stemming from the impact of imperialism, which was why they put their energy into the Swaraj campaigns; but they also saw their oppression in the patriarchal organisation of the family, which they expressed through a number of demands including the Hindu Code.

The Hindu Code embodied changes in the area of personal law which particularly affected women, such as marriage and inheritance. The Code which eventually became law after Independence provided for monogamy, inter-caste and inter-religion marriage, divorce, and equal inheritance and adoption rights for women. Many men in the National Movement opposed it since it challenged the basis of their own privilege in the family, but the Code was finally enacted after the first General Election, thanks mainly to Nehru’s sponsorship and his established supremacy in the new government (Everett, 1981: 187–188). The women’s organisations also tried to have housework included in the national accounting process (Mazumdar, 1979: xvi), and attempted to insert a clause into the Constitution guaranteeing equality in marriage (Everett, 1981: 161–162). Both attempts failed, but
they demonstrate that the Women’s Movement had a clear vision of the source of their oppression in the personal areas of marriage, inheritance and domesticity, as well as from the impact of imperialism.

On some of their other demands they were more clearly supported by the men in the Freedom Movement. Women’s suffrage, for example, was supported by all the major political groupings in India as early as 1919, for a number of reasons. One was that any increase in Indian suffrage was likely to be unfavourable to the British. Another was to demonstrate that India was eager for women to have the vote, in contrast to British men who failed to fully enfranchise their own women until 1928 after a 50-year fight. This was illustrated by Dumasia, a member of the Provincial Assembly who, commenting on India’s adoption of the principle of female suffrage, said:

‘It is gratifying to find that in a country where men are accused of treating women as chattels the political progress of women has been more rapid than in England’ (Leg. Ass. Debates 1926, quoted in Forbes, 1979).

Thanks to the Women’s Movement’s activities around both national and female liberation, the Indian National Congress adopted the principles of female suffrage and sexual equality in 1928, in its draft Constitution. At Independence Congress instituted universal adult suffrage and a constitutional guarantee of sex, caste and religious equality (Everett, 1981: 113–115). So women not only played a vital and active part in the struggle against imperialism, but were also responsible for the introduction of two revolutionary concepts into Indian politics: universal adult suffrage and economic and political equality of the sexes.

The importance of women in the demise of the Raj

Women’s participation in the Freedom Movement was crucial for a number of reasons. The presence of vast numbers of women helped to turn the struggle into a mass movement, filling the courts and the prisons, and taking over the leadership when the men were arrested. Second, quite apart from the consideration of numbers, women provided a different quality to the campaign. Gandhi believed that women’s capacity for self-sacrifice and years of silent suffering were the ideal training for the courage and self-control required of his passive resisters. His view was that, unlike men, women could be relied upon to act passively and non-violently in the face of violent provocation from the authorities. Women responded to his call, and to Gandhi’s unique faith in their abilities.

A third and extremely significant factor was the impact that the presence of large numbers of women had on the British. Not only did it upset their stereotypes of Indian women, demonstrating that they were not the subjugated creatures the British had supposed, it also exposed their hypocrisy over Indian men’s maltreatment of women, since they themselves were prepared to order the intimidation and beating of women demonstrators by troops and police. And it undermined the legitimacy of British rejection of Swaraj, for the very women whom the British claimed they were there to protect and liberate from the patriarchal abuses of their own men were taking up the fight against their foreign ‘protectors’, destroying the moral argument for Britain’s presence in a foreign land at the same time as adding a moral force to the cause of freedom. It was this which the British authorities so bitterly resented.

On the constructive side, the presence of women in the freedom struggle had a profound effect on the institutions of the new society at Independence: a constitutional guarantee of sex equality decades before women in the U.S. began their unsuccessful campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment; a guarantee against discrimination in employment or offices long before Britain’s Sex Discrimination Act entered the statute books; female suffrage without a fight, twenty years before women in Switzerland received the vote; and in the 1950s, a comprehensive reform of Hindu personal law, which began to challenge the very basis of men’s privilege in the family. How the laws were implemented is, of course, another issue in all these countries.

So women’s subordination was an important factor in the maintenance of the Raj, and women played a crucial role in its demise. In the process they revolutionised women’s legal position and introduced the concept of equal individual rights into Indian politics. This was the heritage and the achievement of the Women’s Movement as much as of the Freedom Movement.

PROGRESSIVE OR REVISIONIST?

The popular re-education of the British on the subject of their former Empire has not merely neglected, but grossly distorted, the crucial significance of women’s role in the Raj and the achievement of Swaraj. We have tried to show that this omission constitutes a serious misrepresentation of history, not simply a detail which could be ignored in the interests of presentational constraints in film and television. From the point of view of women’s contribution, the Raj Revival has been a process not of re-discovering Indo-British history, but of hiding it. Far from a progressive reassessment, it represents a conservative cover-up of Britain’s cynical abuse and manipulation of Indian women’s subordination in the interests of imperialism, and a reactionary eradication of their politicisation, contained within a rather cosy critique. To this
extent the Revival can rightly be accused of revisionism.

What then is the revisionist view of the Raj that is being popularly portrayed and enthusiastically responded to by the television and film watching public, and why has such a revision taken place? The Revival contains two important political messages which are relevant today. Both are deeply reactionary for people still concerned with the issues raised during the Swaraj movement.

The first concerns the liberation of the third world from their colonial masters, and is best expressed in the *Jewel in the Crown*. The series largely avoided the Indian version of history, whether of men or women. The focus of the story was the rape of an Englishwoman who was too sympathetic towards India, by a gang of Indian peasants, during which all the structural divisions of society—sex, class and race—were violated. As a metaphor for the economics of Indo-British relations, the rape is meaningless, but as a metaphor for the ideological relations between imperialism and patriarchy, it makes sense. It represents Britain's moral right to occupy India in order to curb the uncivilised barbarities of Indian men, respecters of neither sex nor class nor race. The rape is the modern equivalent of Katherine Mayo's book in the 1920s, highlighting the 'filthy personal habits' of the Indian masses, and by implication the 'degradation of Hindu women', but wrapped in a fashionable critique of the political colonialism of the past, as if the West's economic exploitation of the third world were not still continuing. The message is that despite mistakes, Britain was justified in occupying India because of the backwardness of the people. We are shown little of the realities of Indian life except its squalor in comparison with the comforts of England. The implications are to legitimate the white racial superiority of the past and, worse, to justify continued Western supremacy in the present.

The second message concerns the liberation of women, and is embodied in the film *Gandhi*. Here the Indian version of the story is more apparent, but equally revisionist in its historically incorrect suggestion that the Freedom Movement was a male affair and women's participation a minor insignificance. If *Jewel in the Crown* avoided any encouragement to anti-imperialists thinking that they could by their own activities break free of Western control, Attenborough's *Gandhi* ensures that no encouragement is given to women supposing that they can through their own initiative change the institutions and attitudes of their society, or even that their contribution to other struggles might be accorded any value. Anyone reading about the women's actions in the Swaraj campaign cannot fail to be struck by the parallels with contemporary struggles of women in Britain and around the world. Women cutting down barbed wire with pliers, women's greater skill at non-violent resistance, women picketers lying down in shop doorways and in roadways, women being beaten by police, courting arrest, filling the prisons. These actions all have their counterparts today. But to have acknowledged Indian women's contribution in the interests of mere historical accuracy would have drawn attention to the similarities, legitimating women's struggles today and suggesting a source from which we might learn some of the lessons of our own history. To make these links with our foremothers across international barriers would be too topical, too threatening for the authorities of today, too uncomfortable for men, and too inspiring for women. The message of the film *Gandhi* is that Indian women were suppressed and servile and their contribution to the freedom fight not worth recounting. The implications are to confirm male sexual superiority and to hide from black and white women alike their heritage of struggle.

**REFERENCES**


Any discussion of the intellectual and political construction of "third world feminisms" must address itself to two simultaneous projects: the internal critique of hegemonic "Western" feminisms, and the formulation of autonomous, geographically, historically, and culturally grounded feminist concerns and strategies. The first project is one of deconstructing and dismantling; the second, one of building and constructing. While these projects appear to be contradictory, the one working negatively and the other positively, unless these two tasks are addressed simultaneously, "third world" feminisms run the risk of marginalization or ghettoization from both mainstream (right and left) and Western feminist discourses.

It is to the first project that I address myself. What I wish to analyze is specifically the production of the "third world woman" as a singular monolithic subject in some recent (Western) feminist texts. The definition of colonization I wish to invoke here is a predominantly discursive one, focusing on a certain mode of appropriation and codification of "scholarship" and "knowledge" about women in the third world by particular
analytic categories employed in specific writings on the subject which take as their referent feminist interests as they have been articulated in the U.S. and Western Europe. If one of the tasks of formulating and understanding the locus of “third world feminisms” is delineating the way in which it resists and works against what I am referring to as “Western feminist discourse,” an analysis of the discursive construction of “third world women” in Western feminism is an important first step.

Clearly Western feminist discourse and political practice is neither singular nor homogeneous in its goals, interests, or analyses. However, it is possible to trace a coherence of effects resulting from the implicit assumption of “the West” (in all its complexities and contradictions) as the primary referent in theory and praxis. My reference to “Western feminism” is by no means intended to imply that it is a monolith. Rather, I am attempting to draw attention to the similar effects of various textual strategies used by writers which codify Others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western. It is in this sense that I use the term Western feminist. Similar arguments can be made in terms of middle-class urban African or Asian scholars producing scholarship on or about their rural or working-class sisters which assumes their own middle-class cultures as the norm, and codifies working-class histories and cultures as Other. Thus, while this essay focuses specifically on what I refer to as “Western feminist” discourse on women in the third world, the critiques I offer also pertain to third world scholars writing about their own cultures, which employ identical analytic strategies.

It ought to be of some political significance, at least, that the term colonization has come to denote a variety of phenomena in recent feminist and left writings in general. From its analytic value as a category of exploitative economic exchange in both traditional and contemporary Marxisms (cf. particularly contemporary theorists such as Baran 1962, Amin 1977, and Gunder-Frank 1967) to its use by feminist women of color in the U.S. to describe the appropriation of their experiences and struggles by hegemonic white women’s movements (cf. especially Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983, Smith 1983, Joseph and Lewis 1981, and Moraga 1984), colonization has been used to characterize everything from the most evident economic and political hierarchies to the production of a particular cultural discourse about what is called the “third world.” However sophisticated or problematical its use as an explanatory construct, colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a suppression—often violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question.

My concern about such writings derives from my own implication and investment in contemporary debates in feminist theory, and the urgent political necessity (especially in the age of Reagan/Bush) of forming stra-
presses most if not all the women in these countries. And it is in the production of this "third world difference" that Western feminisms appropriate and "colonize" the constitutive complexities which characterize the lives of women in these countries. It is in this process of discursive homogenization and systematization of the oppression of women in the third world that power is exercised in much of recent Western feminist discourse, and this power needs to be defined and named.

In the context of the West's hegemonic position today, of what Anouar Abdel-Malek (1981) calls a struggle for "control over the orientation, regulation and decision of the process of world development on the basis of the advanced sector's monopoly of scientific knowledge and ideal creativity," Western feminist scholarship on the third world must be seen and examined precisely in terms of its inscription in these particular relations of power and struggle. There is, it should be evident, no universal patriarchal framework which this scholarship attempts to counter and resist—unless one posits an international male conspiracy or a monolithic, ahistorical power structure. There is, however, a particular world balance of power within which any analysis of culture, ideology, and socioeconomic conditions necessarily has to be situated. Abdel-Malek is useful here, again, in reminding us about the inherence of politics in the discourses of "culture":

Contemporary imperialism is, in a real sense, a hegemonic imperialism, exercising to a maximum degree a rationalized violence taken to a higher level than ever before—through fire and sword, but also through the attempt to control hearts and minds. For its content is defined by the combined action of the military-industrial complex and the hegemonic cultural centers of the West, all of them founded on the advanced levels of development attained by monopoly and finance capital, and supported by the benefits of both the scientific and technological revolution and the second industrial revolution itself. (145–46)

Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and examining its role in such a global economic and political framework. To do any less would be to ignore the complex interconnections between first and third world economies and the profound effect of this on the lives of women in all countries. I do not question the descriptive and informative value of most Western feminist writings on women in the third world. I also do not question the existence of excellent work which does not fall into the analytic traps with which I am concerned. In fact I deal with an example of such work later on. In the context of an overwhelming silence about the experiences of women in these countries, as well as the need to forge international links between women's political struggles, such work is both pathbreaking and absolutely essen-
they imply and suggest. I argue that as a result of the two modes—or, rather, frames—of analysis described above, a homogeneous notion of the oppression of women as a group is assumed, which, in turn, produces the image of an “average third world woman.” This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being “third world” (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions.

The distinction between Western feminist re-presentation of women in the third world and Western feminist self-presentation is a distinction of the same order as that made by some Marxists between the “maintenance” function of the housewife and the real “productive” role of wage labor, or the characterization by developmentalists of the third world as being engaged in the lesser production of “raw materials” in contrast to the “real” productive activity of the first world. These distinctions are made on the basis of the privileging of a particular group as the norm or referent. Men involved in wage labor, first world producers, and, I suggest, Western feminists who sometimes cast third world women in terms of “ourselves undressed” (Michelle Rosaldo’s [1980] term), all construct themselves as the normative referent in such a binary analytic.

“Women” as Category of Analysis, or: We Are All Sisters in Struggle

By women as a category of analysis, I am referring to the crucial assumption that all of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a homogeneous group identified prior to the process of analysis. This is an assumption which characterizes much feminist discourse. The homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials but rather on the basis of secondary sociological and anthropological universals. Thus, for instance, in any given piece of feminist analysis, women are characterized as a singular group on the basis of a shared oppression. What binds women together is a sociological notion of the “sameness” of their oppression. It is at this point that an elision takes place between “women” as a discursively constructed group and “women” as material subjects of their own history. Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of “women” as a group is mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women. This results in an assumption of women as an always already constituted group, one which has been labeled “powerless,” “exploited,” “sexually harassed,” etc., by feminist scientific, economic, legal, and sociological discourses. (Notice that this is quite similar to sexist discourse labeling women weak, emotional, having math anxiety, etc.) This focus is not on uncovering the material and ideological specificities that constitute a particular group of women as “powerless” in a particular context. It is, rather, on finding a variety of cases of “powerless” groups of women to prove the general point that women as a group are powerless.

In this section I focus on five specific ways in which “women” as a category of analysis is used in Western feminist discourse on women in the third world. Each of these examples illustrates the construction of “third world women” as a homogeneous “powerless” group often located as implicit victims of particular socioeconomic systems. I have chosen to deal with a variety of writers—from Fran Hosken, who writes primarily about female genital mutilation, to writers from the Women in International Development school, who write about the effect of development policies on third world women for both Western and third world audiences. The similarity of assumptions about “third world women” in all these texts forms the basis of my discussion. This is not to equate all the texts that I analyze, nor is it to equalize their strengths and weaknesses. The authors I deal with write with varying degrees of care and complexity; however, the effect of their representation of third world women is a coherent one. In these texts women are defined as victims of male violence (Fran Hosken); victims of the colonial process (Maria Cutrufelli); victims of the Arab familial system (Juilette Minces); victims of the economic development process (Beverley Lindsay and the [liberal] WID School); and finally, victims of the Islamic code (Patricia Jeffery). This mode of defining women primarily in terms of their object status (the way in which they are affected or not affected by certain institutions and systems) is what characterizes this particular form of the use of “women” as a category of analysis. In the context of Western women writing/studying women in the third world, such objectification (however benevolently motivated) needs to be both named and challenged. As Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar argue quite eloquently, “Feminist theories which examine our cultural practices as ‘feudal residues’ or label us ‘traditional,’ also portray us as politically immature women who need to be versed and schooled in the ethos of Western feminism. They need to be continually challenged . . .” (1984, 7).

Women as Victims of Male Violence

Fran Hosken, in writing about the relationship between human rights and female genital mutilation in Africa and the Middle East, bases her whole discussion/condemnation of genital mutilation on one privileged premise: that the goal of this practice is “to mutilate the sexual pleasure and satisfaction of woman” (1981, 11). This, in turn, leads her to claim
that woman’s sexuality is controlled, as is her reproductive potential. According to Hosken, “male sexual politics” in Africa and around the world “share the same political goal: to assure female dependence and subservience by any and all means” (14). Physical violence against women (rape, sexual assault, excision, infibulation, etc.) is thus carried out “with an astonishing consensus among men in the world” (14). Here, women are defined consistently as the victims of male control—the “sexually oppressed.” Although it is true that the potential of male violence against women circumscribes and elucidates their social position to a certain extent, defining women as archetypal victims freezes them into “objects-who-defend-themselves,” men into “subjects-who-perpetrate-violence,” and (every) society into powerless (read: women) and powerful (read: men) groups of people. Male violence must be theorized and interpreted within specific societies, in order both to understand it better and to effectively organize to change it. Sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete historical and political practice and analysis.

Women as Universal Dependents

Beverly Lindsay’s conclusion to the book Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex and Class (1983, 298, 306) states: “dependency relationships, based upon race, sex and class, are being perpetuated through social, educational, and economic institutions. These are the linkages among Third World Women.” Here, in other places, Lindsay implies that third world women constitute an identifiable group purely on the basis of shared dependencies. If shared dependencies were all that was needed to bind us together as a group, third world women would always be seen as an apolitical group with no subject status. Instead, if anything, it is the common context of political struggle against class, race, gender, and imperial hierarchies that may constitute third world women as a strategic group at this historical juncture. Lindsay also states that linguistic and cultural differences exist between Vietnamese and black American women, but “both groups are victims of race, sex, and class.” Again black and Vietnamese women are characterized by their victim status.

Similarly, examine statements such as “My analysis will start by stating that all African women are politically and economically dependent” (Cutrufelli 1983, 13), “Nevertheless, either overtly or covertly, prostitution is still the main if not the only source of work for African women” (Cutrufelli 1983, 33). All African women are dependent. Prostitution is the only work option for African women as a group. Both statements are illustrative of generalizations sprinkled liberally through a recent Zed Press publication, Women of Africa: Roots of Oppression, by Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, who is described on the cover as an Italian writer, sociologist, Marxist, and feminist. In the 1980s, is it possible to imagine writing a book entitled Women of Europe: Roots of Oppression? I am not objecting to the use of universal groupings for descriptive purposes. Women from the continent of Africa can be descriptively characterized as “women of Africa.” It is when “women of Africa” becomes a homogeneous sociological grouping characterized by common dependencies or powerlessness (or even strengths) that problems arise—we say too little and too much at the same time.

This is because descriptive gender differences are transformed into the division between men and women. Women are constituted as a group via dependency relationships vis-à-vis men, who are implicitly held responsible for these relationships. When “women of Africa” as a group (versus “men of Africa” as a group?) are seen as a group precisely because they are generally dependent and oppressed, the analysis of specific historical differences becomes impossible, because reality is always apparently structured by divisions—two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive groups, the victims and the oppressors. Here the sociological is substituted for the biological, in order, however, to create the same—a unity of women. Thus, it is not the descriptive potential of gender difference but the privileged positioning and explanatory potential of gender difference as the origin of oppression that I question. In using “women of Africa” (as an already constituted group of oppressed peoples) as a category of analysis, Cutrufelli denies any historical specificity to the location of women as subordinate, powerful, marginal, central, or otherwise, vis-à-vis particular social and power networks. Women are taken as a unified “powerless” group prior to the analysis in question. Thus, it is then merely a matter of specifying the context after the fact. “Women” are now placed in the context of the family, or in the workplace, or within religious networks, almost as if these systems existed outside the relations of women with other women, and women with men.

The problem with this analytic strategy, let me repeat, is that it assumes men and women are already constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the arena of social relations. Only if we subscribe to this assumption is it possible to undertake analysis which looks at the “effects” of kinship structures, colonialism, organization of labor, etc., on women, who are defined in advance as a group. The crucial point that is forgotten is that women are produced through these very relations as well as being implicated in forming these relations. As Michelle Rosaldo argues, “woman’s place in human social life is not in any direct sense a product of the things she does (or even less, a function of what, biologically, she is) but the meaning her activities acquire through concrete social
Married Women as Victims of the Colonial Process

In Lévi-Strauss’s theory of kinship structure as a system of the exchange of women, what is significant is that exchange itself is not constitutive of the subordination of women; women are not subordinate because of the fact of exchange, but because of the modes of exchange instituted, and the values attached to these modes. However, in discussing the marriage ritual of the Bemba, a Zambian matrilocal, matrilineal people, Cutrufelli in Women of Africa focuses on the fact of the marital exchange of women before and after Western colonization, rather than the value attached to this exchange in this particular context. This leads to her definition of Bemba women as a coherent group affected in a particular way by colonization. Here again, Bemba women are constituted rather unilaterally as victims of the effects of Western colonization.

Cutrufelli cites the marriage ritual of the Bemba as a multistage event “whereby a young man becomes incorporated into his wife’s family group as he takes up residence with them and gives his services in return for food and maintenance” (43). This ritual extends over many years, and the sexual relationship varies according to the degree of the girl’s physical maturity. It is only after she undergoes an initiation ceremony at puberty that intercourse is sanctioned, and the man acquires legal rights over her. This initiation ceremony is the more important act of the consecration of women’s reproductive power, so that the abduction of an uninitiated girl is of no consequence, while heavy penalty is levied for the seduction of an initiated girl. Cutrufelli asserts that the effect of European colonization has changed the whole marriage system. Now the young man is entitled to take his wife away from her people in return for money. The implication is that Bemba women have now lost the protection of tribal laws. However, while it is possible to see how the structure of the traditional marriage contract (versus the postcolonial marriage contract) offered women a certain amount of control over their marital relations, only an analysis of the political significance of the actual practice which privileges an initiated girl over an uninitiated one, indicating a shift in female power relations as a result of this ceremony, can provide an accurate account of whether Bemba women were indeed protected by tribal laws at all times.

However, it is not possible to talk about Bemba women as a homogeneous group within the traditional marriage structure. Bemba women...
Power, Representation, and Feminist Critique

over from the times of the prophet Mohammed. They exist, as it were, outside history.

Women and Religious Ideologies

A further example of the use of “women” as a category of analysis is found in cross-cultural analyses which subscribe to a certain economic reductionism in describing the relationship between the economy and factors such as politics and ideology. Here, in reducing the level of comparison to the economic relations between “developed and developing” countries, any specificity to the question of women is denied. Mina Modares (1981), in a careful analysis of women and Shi’ism in Iran, focuses on this very problem when she criticizes feminist writings which treat Islam as an ideology separate from and outside social relations and practices, rather than a discourse which includes rules for economic, social, and power relations within society. Patricia Jeffery’s (1979) otherwise informative work on Pirzada women in purdah considers Islamic ideology a partial explanation for the status of women in that it provides a justification for the purdah. Here, Islamic ideology is reduced to a set of ideas whose internalization by Pirzada women contributes to the stability of the system. However, the primary explanation for purdah is located in the control that Pirzada men have over economic resources, and the personal security purdah gives to Pirzada women.

By taking a specific version of Islam as the Islam, Jeffery attributes a singularity and coherence to it. Modares notes, “’Islamic Theology’ then becomes imposed on a separate and given entity called ‘women.’ A further unification is reached: Women (meaning all women), regardless of their differing positions within societies, come to be affected or not affected by Islam. These conceptions provide the right ingredients for an unproblematic possibility of a cross-cultural study of women” (63). Marnia Lazreg makes a similar argument when she addresses the reductionism inherent in scholarship on women in the Middle East and North Africa:

A ritual is established whereby the writer appeals to religion as the cause of gender inequality just as it is made the source of underdevelopment in much of modernization theory. In an uncanny way, feminist discourse on women from the Middle East and North Africa mirrors that of theologians’ own interpretation of women in Islam....

The overall effect of this paradigm is to deprive women of self-presence, of being. Because women are subsumed under religion presented in fundamental terms, they are inevitably seen as evolving in nonhistorical time. They virtually have no history. Any analysis of change is therefore foreclosed. (1988, 87)

While Jeffery’s analysis does not quite succumb to this kind of unitary notion of religion (Islam), it does collapse all ideological specificities into economic relations, and universalizes on the basis of this comparison.

Women and the Development Process

The best examples of universalization on the basis of economic reductionism can be found in the liberal “Women in Development” literature. Proponents of this school seek to examine the effect of development on third world women, sometimes from self-designated feminist perspectives. At the very least, there is evident interest in and commitment to improving the lives of women in “developing” countries. Scholars such as Irene Tinker and Michelle Bo Bromsen (1972), Ester Boserup (1970), and Perdita Huston (1979) have all written about the effect of development policies on women in the third world. All three women assume “development” is synonymous with “economic development” or “economic progress.” As in the case of Mincos’s patriarchal family, Hosken’s male sexual control, and Cutrufelli’s Western colonization, development here becomes the all-time equalizer. Women are affected positively or negatively by economic development policies, and this is the basis for cross-cultural comparison.

For instance, Perdita Huston (1979) states that the purpose of her study is to describe the effect of the development process on the “family unit and its individual members” in Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, and Mexico. She states that the “problems” and “needs” expressed by rural and urban women in these countries all center around education and training, work and wages, access to health and other services, political participation, and legal rights. Huston relates all these “needs” to the lack of sensitive development policies which exclude women as a group or category. For her, the solution is simple: implement improved development policies which emphasize training for women fieldworkers, use women trainees, and women rural development officers, encourage women’s cooperatives, etc. Here again, women are assumed to be a coherent group or category prior to their entry into “the development process.” For her, the solution is simple: implement improved development policies which emphasize training for women fieldworkers, use women trainees, and women rural development officers, encourage women’s cooperatives, etc. Here again, women are assumed to be a coherent group or category prior to their entry into “the development process.” Huston assumes that all third world women have similar problems and needs. Thus, they must have similar interests and goals. However, the interests of urban, middle-class, educated Egyptian housewives, to take only one instance, could surely not be seen as being the same as those of their uneducated, poor maids. Development policies do not affect both groups of women in the same way. Practices which characterize women’s status and roles vary according to class. Women are constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion, and other ideological institutions and frameworks. They are not “women”—a co-
herent group—solely on the basis of a particular economic system or policy. Such reductive cross-cultural comparisons result in the colonization of the specifics of daily existence and the complexities of political interests which women of different social classes and cultures represent and mobilize.

Thus, it is revealing that for Perdita Huston, women in the third world countries she writes about have “needs” and “problems,” but few if any have “choices” or the freedom to act. This is an interesting representation of women in the third world, one which is significant in suggesting a latent self-presentation of Western women which bears looking at. She writes, “What surprised and moved me most as I listened to women in such very different cultural settings was the striking commonality—whether they were educated or illiterate, urban or rural—of their most basic values: the importance they assign to family, dignity, and service to others” (1979, 115). Would Huston consider such values unusual for women in the West?

What is problematical about this kind of use of “women” as a group, as a stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal unity between women based on a generalized notion of their subordination. Instead of analytically demonstrating the production of women as socioeconomic political groups within particular local contexts, this analytical move limits the definition of the female subject to gender identity, completely bypassing social class and ethnic identities. What characterizes women as a group is their gender (sociologically, not necessarily biologically, defined) over and above everything else, indicating a monolithic notion of sexual difference. Because women are thus constituted as a coherent group, sexual difference becomes coterminous with female subordination, and power is automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it (read: men), and people who do not (read: women). Men exploit, women are exploited. Such simplistic formulations are historically reductive; they are also ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is reinforce binary divisions between men and women.

What would an analysis which did not do this look like? Maria Mies’s work illustrates the strength of Western feminist work on women in the third world which does not fall into the traps discussed above. Mies’s study of the lace makers of Narsapur, India (1982), attempts to carefully analyze a substantial household industry in which “housewives” produce lace doilies for consumption in the world market. Through a detailed analysis of the structure of the lace industry, production and reproduction relations, the sexual division of labor, profits and exploitation, and the overall consequences of defining women as “non-working housewives” and their work as “leisure-time activity,” Mies demonstrates the levels of exploitation in this industry and the impact of this production system on the work and living conditions of the women involved in it. In addition, she is able to analyze the “ideology of the housewife,” the notion of a woman sitting in the house, as providing the necessary subjective and sociocultural element for the creation and maintenance of a production system that contributes to the increasing pauperization of women, and keeps them totally atomized and disorganized as workers. Mies’s analysis shows the effect of a certain historically and culturally specific mode of patriarchal organization, an organization constructed on the basis of the definition of the lace makers as “non-working housewives” at familial, local, regional, statewide, and international levels. The intricacies and the effects of particular power networks not only are emphasized, but they form the basis of Mies’s analysis of how this particular group of women is situated at the center of a hegemonic, exploitative world market.

This is a good example of what careful, politically focused, local analyses can accomplish. It illustrates how the category of women is constructed in a variety of political contexts that often exist simultaneously and overlaid on top of one another. There is no easy generalization in the direction of “women” in India, or “women in the third world”; nor is there a reduction of the political construction of the exploitation of the lace makers to cultural explanations about the passivity or obedience that might characterize these women and their situation. Finally, this mode of local, political analysis which generates theoretical categories from within the situation and context being analyzed, also suggests corresponding effective strategies for organizing against the exploitation faced by the lace makers. Narsapur women are not mere victims of the production process, because they resist, challenge, and subvert the process at various junctures. Here is one instance of how Mies delineates the connections between the housewife ideology, the self-consciousness of the lace makers, and their interrelationships as contributing to the latent resistances she perceives among the women:

The persistence of the housewife ideology, the self-perception of the lace makers as petty commodity producers rather than as workers, is not only upheld by the structure of the industry as such but also by the deliberate propagation and reinforcement of reactionary patriarchal norms and institutions. Thus, most of the lace makers voiced the same opinion about the rules of purdah and seclusion in their communities which were also propagated by the lace exporters. In particular, the Kapu women said that they had never gone out of their houses, that women of their community could not do any other work than housework and lace work etc. but in spite of the fact that most of them still subscribed fully to the patriarchal norms of the gotha women, there were also contradictory elements in their consciousness. Thus, although they looked down with contempt upon women who were able to
Power, Representation, and Feminist Critique

work outside the house—like the untouchable Mala and Madiga women or women of other lower castes, they could not ignore the fact that these women were earning more money precisely because they were not respectable housewives but workers. At one discussion, they even admitted that it would be better if they could also go out and do coolie work. And when they were asked whether they would be ready to come out of their houses and work in one place in some sort of a factory, they said they would do that. This shows that the purdah and housewife ideology, although still fully internalized, already had some cracks, because it has been confronted with several contradictory realities. (157)

It is only by understanding the contradictions inherent in women’s location within various structures that effective political action and challenges can be devised. Mies’s study goes a long way toward offering such analysis. While there are now an increasing number of Western feminist writings in this tradition, there is also, unfortunately, a large block of writing which succumbs to the cultural reductionism discussed earlier.

Methodological Universalisms, or: Women’s Oppression Is a Global Phenomenon

Western feminist writings on women in the third world subscribe to a variety of methodologies to demonstrate the universal cross-cultural operation of male dominance and female exploitation. I summarize and critique three such methods below, moving from the simplest to the most complex.

First, proof of universalism is provided through the use of an arithmetic method. The argument goes like this: the greater the number of women who wear the veil, the more universal is the sexual segregation and control of women (Deardon 1975, 4–5). Similarly, a large number of different, fragmented examples from a variety of countries also apparently add up to a universal fact. For instance, Muslim women in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Egypt all wear some sort of a veil. Hence, this indicates that the sexual control of women is a universal fact in those countries in which the women are veiled (Deardon 1975, 7, 10). Fran Hosken writes, “Rape, forced prostitution, polygamy, genital mutilation, pornography, the beating of girls and women, purdah (segregation of women) are all violations of basic human rights” (1981, 15). By equating purdah with rape, domestic violence, and forced prostitution, Hosken asserts its “sexual control” function as the primary explanation for purdah, whatever the context. Institutions of purdah are thus denied any cultural and historical specificity, and contradictions and potentially subversive aspects are totally ruled out.

In both these examples, the problem is not in asserting that the practice of wearing a veil is widespread. This assertion can be made on the basis of numbers. It is a descriptive generalization. However, it is the analytic leap from the practice of veiling to an assertion of its general significance in controlling women that must be questioned. While there may be a physical similarity in the veils worn by women in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the specific meaning attached to this practice varies according to the cultural and ideological context. In addition, the symbolic space occupied by the practice of purdah may be similar in certain contexts, but this does not automatically indicate that the practices themselves have identical significance in the social realm. For example, as is well known, Iranian middle-class women veiled themselves during the 1979 revolution to indicate solidarity with their veiled working-class sisters, while in contemporary Iran, mandatory Islamic laws dictate that all Iranian women wear veils. While in both these instances, similar reasons might be offered for the veil (opposition to the Shah and Western cultural colonization in the first case, and the true Islamicization of Iran in the second), the concrete meanings attached to Iranian women wearing the veil are clearly different in both historical contexts. In the first case, wearing the veil is both an oppositional and a revolutionary gesture on the part of Iranian middle-class women; in the second case, it is a coercive, institutional mandate (see Tabari 1980 for detailed discussion). It is on the basis of such context-specific differentiated analysis that effective political strategies can be generated. To assume that the mere practice of veiling women in a number of Muslim countries indicates the universal oppression of women through sexual segregation not only is analytically reductive, but also proves quite useless when it comes to the elaboration of oppositional political strategy.

Second, concepts such as reproduction, the sexual division of labor, the family, marriage, household, patriarchy, etc., are often used without their specification in local cultural and historical contexts. Feminists use these concepts in providing explanations for women’s subordination, apparently assuming their universal applicability. For instance, how is it possible to refer to “the” sexual division of labor when the content of this division changes radically from one environment to the next, and from one historical juncture to another? At its most abstract level, it is the fact of the differential assignation of tasks according to sex that is significant; however, this is quite different from the meaning or value that the content of this sexual division of labor assumes in different contexts. In most cases the assigning of tasks on the basis of sex has an ideological origin. There is no question that a claim such as “women are concentrated in service-oriented occupations in a large number of countries around the world” is descriptively valid. Descriptively, then, perhaps the existence of a similar sexual division of labor (where women work in service occupations such as nursing, social work, etc., and men in other kinds of occupations)
in a variety of different countries can be asserted. However, the concept of the "sexual division of labor" is more than just a descriptive category. It indicates the differential value placed on "men's work" versus "women's work."

Often the mere existence of a sexual division of labor is taken to be proof of the oppression of women in various societies. This results from a confusion between and collapsing together of the descriptive and explanatory potential of the concept of the sexual division of labor. Superficially similar situations may have radically different, historically specific explanations, and cannot be treated as identical. For instance, the rise of female-headed households in middle-class America might be construed as a sign of great independence and feminist progress, whereby women are considered to have chosen to be single parents, there are increasing numbers of lesbian mothers, etc. However, the recent increase in female-headed households in Latin America, where women might be seen to have more decision-making power, is concentrated among the poorest strata, where life choices are the most constrained economically. A similar argument can be made for the rise of female-headed families among black and Chicana women in the U.S. The positive correlation between this and the level of poverty among women of color and white working-class women in the U.S. has now even acquired a name: the feminization of poverty. Thus, while it is possible to state that there is a rise in female-headed households in the U.S. and in Latin America, this rise cannot be discussed as a universal indicator of women's independence, nor can it be discussed as a universal indicator of women's impoverishment. The meaning of and explanation for the rise obviously vary according to the sociohistorical context.

Similarly, the existence of a sexual division of labor in most contexts cannot be sufficient explanation for the universal subjugation of women in the work force. That the sexual division of labor does indicate a devaluation of women's work must be shown through analysis of particular local contexts. In addition, devaluation of women must also be shown through careful analysis. In other words, the "sexual division of labor" and "women" are not commensurate analytical categories. Concepts such as the sexual division of labor can be useful only if they are generated through local, contextual analyses (see Eldhom, Harris, and Young 1977). If such concepts are assumed to be universally applicable, the resultant homogenization of class, race, religious, and daily material practices of women in the third world can create a false sense of the commonality of oppressions, interests, and struggles between and among women globally. Beyond sisterhood there are still racism, colonialism, and imperialism!

Finally, some writers confuse the use of gender as a superordinate category of organizing analysis with the universalistic proof and instantiation of this category. In other words, empirical studies of gender differences are confused with the analytical organization of cross-cultural work. Beverly Brown's (1983) review of the book Nature, Culture and Gender (Strathern and McCormack 1980) best illustrates this point. Brown suggests that nature:culture and female:male are superordinate categories which organize and locate lesser categories (such as wild/domestic and biology/technology) within their logic. These categories are universal in the sense that they organize the universe of a system of representations. This relation is totally independent of the universal substantiation of any particular category. Her critique hinges on the fact that rather than clarify the generalizability of nature:culture :: female:male as subordinate organization categories, Nature, Culture and Gender construes the universality of this equation to lie at the level of empirical truth, which can be investigated through fieldwork. Thus, the usefulness of the nature:culture :: female:male paradigm as a universal mode of the organization of representation within any particular sociohistorical system is lost. Here, methodological universalism is assumed on the basis of the reduction of the nature:culture :: female:male analytic categories to a demand for empirical proof of its existence in different cultures. Discourses of representation are confused with material realities, and the distinction made earlier between "Woman" and "women" is lost. Feminist work which blurs this distinction (which is, interestingly enough, often present in certain Western feminists' self-representation) eventually ends up constructing monolithic images of "third world women" by ignoring the complex and mobile relationships between their historical materiality on the level of specific oppressions and political choices, on the one hand, and their general discursive representations, on the other.

To summarize: I have discussed three methodological moves identifiable in feminist and other academic cross-cultural work which seeks to uncover a universality in women's subordinate position in society. The next and final section pulls together the previous sections, attempting to outline the political effects of the analytical strategies in the context of Western feminist writing on women in the third world. These arguments are not against generalization as much as they are for careful, historically specific generalizations responsive to complex realities. Nor do these arguments deny the necessity of forming strategic political identities and affinities. Thus, while Indian women of different religions, castes, and classes might forge a political unity on the basis of organizing against police brutality toward women (see Kishwar and Vanita 1984), an analysis of police brutality must be contextual. Strategic coalitions which construct oppositional political identities for themselves are based on generalization and provisional unities, but the analysis of these group identities cannot be based on universalistic, ahistorical categories.
The Subject(s) of Power

This last section returns to an earlier point about the inherently political nature of feminist scholarship, and attempts to clarify my point about the possibility of detecting a colonialist move in the case of a hegemonic first-third world connection in scholarship. The nine texts in the Zed Press Women in the Third World series that I have discussed focused on the following common areas in examining women’s “status” within various societies: religion, family/kinship structures, the legal system, the sexual division of labor, education, and finally, political resistance. A large number of Western feminist writings on women in the third world focus on these themes. Of course the Zed texts have varying emphases. For instance, two of the studies, Women of Palestine (Downing 1982) and Indian Women in Struggle (Omvedt 1980), focus explicitly on female militancy and political participation, while Women in Arab Society (Minces 1980) deals with Arab women’s legal, religious, and familial status. In addition, each text evidences a variety of methodologies and degrees of care in making generalizations. Interestingly enough, however, almost all the texts assume “women” as a category of analysis in the manner designated above.

Clearly this is an analytical strategy which is neither limited to these Zed Press publications nor symptomatic of Zed Press publications in general. However, each of the particular texts in question assumes “women” have a coherent group identity within the different cultures discussed, prior to their entry into social relations. Thus, Omvedt can talk about “Indian women” while referring to a particular group of women in the State of Maharashtra, Cutrufelli about “women of Africa,” and Minces about “Arab women” as if these groups of women have some sort of obvious cultural coherence, distinct from men in these societies. The “status” or “position” of women is assumed to be self-evident, because women as an already constituted group are placed within religious, economic, familial, and legal structures. However, this focus whereby women are seen as a coherent group across contexts, regardless of class or ethnicity, structures the world in ultimately binary, dichotomous terms, where women are always seen in opposition to men, patriarchy is always necessarily male dominance, and the religious, legal, economic, and familial systems are implicitly assumed to be constructed by men. Thus, both men and women are always apparently constituted whole populations, and relations of dominance and exploitation are also posited in terms of whole peoples—wholes coming into exploitative relations. It is only when men and women are seen as different categories or groups possessing different already constituted categories of experience, cognition, and interests as groups that such a simplistic dichotomy is possible.

What happens when this assumption of “women as an oppressed group” is situated in the context of Western feminist writing about third world women? It is here that I locate the colonialist move. By contrast, the representation of women in the third world with what I referred to earlier as Western feminisms’ self-presentation in the same context, we see how Western feminists alone become the true “subjects” of this counterhistory. Third world women, on the other hand, never rise above the debilitating generality of their “object” status.

While radical and liberal feminist assumptions of women as a sex class might elucidate (however inadequately) the autonomy of particular women’s struggles in the West, the application of the notion of women as a homogeneous category to women in the third world colonizes and ap-
propriates the pluralities of the simultaneous location of different groups of women in social class and ethnic frameworks; in doing so it ultimately robs them of their historical and political agency. Similarly, many Zed Press authors who ground themselves in the basic analytic strategies of traditional Marxism also implicitly create a “unity” of women by substituting “women’s activity” for “labor” as the primary theoretical determinant of women’s situation. Here again, women are constituted as a coherent group not on the basis of “natural” qualities or needs but on the basis of the sociological “unity” of their role in domestic production and wage labor (see Haraway 1985, esp. p. 76). In other words, Western feminist discourse, by assuming women as a coherent, already constituted group which is placed in kinship, legal, and other structures, defines third world women as subjects outside social relations, instead of looking at the way women are constituted through these very structures.

Legal, economic, religious, and familial structures are treated as phenomena to be judged by Western standards. It is here that ethnocentric universalism comes into play. When these structures are defined as “underdeveloped” or “developing” and women are placed within them, an implicit image of the “average third world woman” is produced. This is the transformation of the (implicitly Western) “oppressed woman” into the “oppressed third world woman.” While the category of “oppressed woman” is generated through an exclusive focus on gender difference, “the oppressed third world woman” category has an additional attribute—the “third world difference!” The “third world difference” includes a paternalistic attitude toward women in the third world. Since discussions of the various themes I identified earlier (kinship, education, religion, etc.) are conducted in the context of the relative “underdevelopment” of the third world (which is nothing less than unjustifiably confusing development with the separate path taken by the West in its development, as well as ignoring the directionality of the first-third world power relationship), third world women as a group or category are automatically and necessarily defined as religious (read “not progressive”), family-oriented (read “traditional”), legal minors (read “they-are-still-not-conscious-of-their-rights”), illiterate (read “ignorant”), domestic (read “backward”), and sometimes revolutionary (read “their-country-is-in-a-state-of-war; they-must-fight!”) This is how the “third world difference” is produced.

When the category of “sexually oppressed women” is located within particular systems in the third world which are defined on a scale which is normed through Eurocentric assumptions, not only are third world women defined in a particular way prior to their entry into social relations, but since no connections are made between first and third world power shifts, the assumption is reinforced that the third world just has not evolved to the extent that the West has. This mode of feminist analysis, by homogenizing and systematizing the experiences of different groups of women in these countries, erases all marginal and resistant modes and experiences. It is significant that none of the texts I reviewed in the Zed Press series focuses on lesbian politics or the politics of ethnic and religious marginal organizations in third world women’s groups. Resistance can thus be defined only as cumulatively reactive, not as something inherent in the operation of power. If power, as Michel Foucault has argued recently, can really be understood only in the context of resistance, this misconceptualization is both analytically and strategically problematical. It limits theoretical analysis as well as reinforces Western cultural imperialism. For in the context of a first/third world balance of power, feminist analyses which perpetuate and sustain the hegemony of the idea of the superiority of the West produce a corresponding set of universal images of the “third world woman,” images such as the veiled woman, the powerful mother, the chaste virgin, the obedient wife, etc. These images exist in universal, ahistorical splendor, setting in motion a colonialist discourse which exercises a very specific power in defining, coding, and maintaining existing first/third world connections.

To conclude, then, let me suggest some disconcerting similarities between the typically authorizing signature of such Western feminist writings on women in the third world, and the authorizing signature of the project of humanism in general—humanism as a Western ideological and political project which involves the necessary recuperation of the “East” and “Woman” as Others. Many contemporary thinkers, including Foucault (1978, 1980), Derrida (1974), Kristeva (1980), Deleuze and Guattari (1977), and Said (1978), have written at length about the underlying anthropomorphism and ethnocentrism which constitute a hegemonic humanistic problematic that repeatedly confirms and legitimates (Western) Man’s centrality. Feminist theorists such as Luce Irigaray (1981), Sarah Kofman (see Berg 1982), and Helene Cixous (1981) have also written about the recuperation and absence of woman/women within Western humanism. The focus of the work of all these thinkers can be stated simply as an uncovering of the political interests that underlie the binary logic of humanistic discourse and ideology whereby, as a valuable recent essay puts it, “the first (majority) term (Identity, Universality, Culture, Disinterestedness, Truth, Sanity, Justice, etc.), which is, in fact, secondary and derivative (a construction), is privileged over and colonizes the second (minority) term (difference, temporality, anarchy, error, interestedness, insanity, deviance, etc.), which is in fact, primary and originative” (Spanos 1984). In other words, it is only insofar as “Woman/Women” and “the East” are defined as Others, or as peripheral, that (Western) Man/Humanism can represent him/itself as the center. It is not the center that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness,
Power, Representation, and Feminist Critique

determines the center. Just as feminists such as Kristeva and Cixous deconstruct the latent anthropomorphism in Western discourse, I have suggested a parallel strategy in this essay in uncovering a latent ethnocentrism in particular feminist writings on women in the third world.17

As discussed earlier, a comparison between Western feminist self-presentation and Western feminist re-presentation of women in the third world yields significant results. Universal images of "the third world woman" (the veiled woman, chaste virgin, etc.), images constructed from adding the "third world difference" to "sexual difference," are predicated upon (and hence obviously bring into sharper focus) assumptions about Western women as secular, liberated, and having control over their own lives. This is not to suggest that Western women are secular, liberated, and in control of their own lives. I am referring to a discursive self-presentation, not necessarily to material reality. If this were a material reality, there would be no need for political movements in the West. Similarly, only from the vantage point of the West is it possible to define the "third world" as underdeveloped and economically dependent. Without the overdetermined discourse that creates the third world, there would be no (singular and privileged) first world. Without the "third world woman," the particular self-presentation of Western women mentioned above would be problematical. I am suggesting, then, that the one enables and sustains the other. This is not to say that the signature of Western feminist writings on the third world has the same authority as the project of Western humanism. However, in the context of the hegemony of the Western scholarly establishment in the production and dissemination of texts, and in the context of the legitimating imperative of humanistic and scientific discourse, the definition of "the third world woman" as a monolith might well tie into the larger economic and ideological praxis of "disinterested" scientific inquiry and pluralism which are the surface manifestations of a latent economic and cultural colonization of the "non-Western" world. It is time to move beyond the Marx who found it possible to say: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.

Notes

This essay would not have been possible without S. P. Mohanty's challenging and careful reading. I would also like to thank Biddy Martin for our numerous discussions about feminist theory and politics. They both helped me think through some of the arguments herein.

1. Terms such as third and first world are very problematical both in suggesting oversimplified similarities between and among countries labeled thus, and in implicitly reinforcing existing economic, cultural, and ideological hierarchies which are conjured up in using such terminology. I use the term "third world" with full awareness of its problems, only because this is the terminology available to us at the moment. The use of quotation marks is meant to suggest a continuous questioning of the designation. Even when I do not use quotation marks, I mean to use the term critically.

2. I am indebted to Teresa de Lauretis for this particular formulation of the project of feminist theorizing. See especially her introduction in de Lauretis, Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); see also Sylvia Wynter, "The Politics of Domination," unpublished manuscript.

3. This argument is similar to Homi Bhabha's definition of colonial discourse as strategically creating a space for a subject people through the production of knowledges and the exercise of power. The full quote reads: "[colonial discourse is] an apparatus of power... an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences. Its predominant strategic function is the creation of a space for a subject people through the production of knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited. It (i.e. colonial discourse) seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of knowledges by coloniser and colonised which are stereotypical but antithetically evaluated" (1983, 23).

4. A number of documents and reports on the UN International Conferences on Women, Mexico City, 1975, and Copenhagen, 1980, as well as the 1976 Wellesley Conference on Women and Development, attest to this. Nawal El Saadawi, Fatima Mernissi, and Mallica Vajarathon (1978) characterize this conference as "American-planned and organized," situating third world participants as passive audiences. They focus especially on the lack of self-consciousness of Western women's implication in the effects of imperialism and racism in their assumption of an "international sisterhood." A recent essay by Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar (1984) characterizes as "imperial" Euro-American feminism which seeks to establish itself as the only legitimate feminism.

5. The Zed Press Women in the Third World series is unique in its conception. I choose to focus on it because it is the only contemporary series I have found which assumes that "women in the third world" are a legitimate and separate subject of study and research. Since 1985, when this essay was first written, numerous new titles have appeared in the Women in the Third World series. Thus, I suspect that Zed has come to occupy a rather privileged position in the dissemination and construction of discourses by and about third world women. A number of the books in this series are excellent, especially those which deal directly with women's resistance struggles. In addition, Zed Press consistently publishes progressive feminist, antiracist, and antiimperialist texts. However, a number of the texts written by feminist sociologists, anthropologists, and journalists are symptomatic of the kind of Western feminist work on women in the third world that concerns me. Thus, an analysis of a few of these particular works in this series can serve as a representative point of entry into the discourse I am attempting to locate and define. My focus on these texts is therefore an attempt at an internal critique: I simply expect and demand more from this series. Needless to say, progressive publishing houses also carry their own authorizing signatures.

Power, Representation, and Feminist Critique

7. Another example of this kind of analysis is Mary Daly’s (1978) *Gyn/Ecology*. Daly’s assumption in this text, that women as a group are sexually victimized, leads to her very problematic comparison between the attitudes toward women witches and healers in the West, Chinese footbinding, and the genital mutilation of women in Africa. According to Daly, women in Europe, China, and Africa constitute a homogeneous group as victims of male power. Not only does this label (sexual victim) eradicate the specific historical and material realities and contradictions which lead to and perpetuate practices such as witch hunting and genital mutilation, but it also obliterates the differences, complexities, and heterogeneities of the lives of, for example, women of different classes, religions, and nations in Africa. As Audre Lorde (1983) pointed out, women in Africa share a long tradition of healers and goddesses that perhaps binds them together more appropriately than their victim status. However, both Daly and Lorde fail prey to universalistic assumptions about “African women” (both victimized and positive). What matters is the complex, historical range of power differences, commonalities, and resistances that exist among women in Africa which construct African women as “subjects” of their own politics.

8. See Eldhom, Harris, and Young (1977) for a good discussion of the necessity to theorize male violence within specific societal frameworks, rather than assume it as a universal fact.


14. *Amy and Parmar describe the cultural stereotypes present in Euro-American feminist thought: “The image is of the passive Asian woman subject to oppressive practices within the Asian family with an emphasis on wanting to help ‘Asiawomen liberate themselves from their role. Or there is the strong, dominant Afro-Caribbean woman, who despite her ‘strength’ is exploited by the ‘sexism’ which is seen as being a strong feature in relationships between Afro-Caribbean men and women.” (9). These images illustrate the extent to which paternalism is an essential element of feminist thinking which incorporates the above stereotypes, a paternalism which can lead to the definition of priorities for women of color by Euro-American feminists.


16. This is one of M. Foucault’s (1978,1980) central points in his reconceptualization of the strategies and workings of power networks.

17. For an argument which demands a new conception of humanism in work on third world women, see *Marnia Lazreg (1988)*. While Lazreg’s position might appear to be diametrically opposed to mine, I see it as a provocative and potentially positive extension of some of the implications that follow from my arguments. In criticizing the feminist rejection of humanism in the name of “essential Man,” Lazreg points to what she calls an “essentialism of difference” within these very feminist projects. She asks: “To what extent can Western feminism dispense with an ethics of responsibility when writing about different women? The point is neither to subsume other women under one’s own experience nor to uphold a separate truth for them. Rather, it is to allow them to be while recognizing that what they are is just as meaningful, valid, and comprehensible as what we are. . . .” Indeed, when feminists essentially deny other women the humanity they claim for themselves, they dispense with any ethical constraint. They engage in the act of splitting the social universe into us and them, subject and objects” (99-100).

This essay by Lazreg and an essay by S. P. Mohanty (1989) entitled “Us and Them: On the Philosophical Bases of Political Criticism” suggest positive directions for self-conscious cross-cultural analyses, analyses which move beyond the deconstructive to a fundamentally productive mode in designating overlapping areas for cross-cultural comparison. The latter essay calls not for a “humanism” but for a reconsideration of the question of the “human” in a posthumanist context. It argues that (1) there is no necessary “incompatibility between the deconstruction of Western humanism” and such “a positive elaboration” of the human, and moreover that (2) such an elaboration is essential if contemporary political-critical discourse is to avoid the incoherences and weaknesses of a relativist position.
Power, Representation, and Feminist Critique

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